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On November 5, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in Yates v. 
United States.1 Yates is somewhat of an oddball case. It deals with a small-
town Florida fisherman convicted of the “anti-shredding provision” of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (commonly referred to as SOX), a law passed to curb 
corporate malfeasance in the aftermath of the massive accounting 
scandals—Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing—of the early 2000s. 
However, the fisherman, John Yates, was not found guilty of cooking his 
company’s books or lying to his shareholders. Instead, Yates was convicted 
of throwing a crate of undersized fish overboard after a federal agent 
inspecting his catch told him not to. A jury found this constituted destroying 
“tangible objects” as defined under the Act, and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed. The Supreme Court will now decide just how closely red grouper 
relates to Enron in what some have dubbed the “fishy SOX case.”2 Oddball 
indeed. 
But as is often true at the Supreme Court, there is more to Yates than 
its headnotes suggest. What may have prompted the Court to take the case, 
which in many ways offers only a modest question of statutory 
interpretation, is the issue of overcriminalization. Overcriminalization is the 
proliferation of criminal statutes and overlapping regulations that impose 
harsh penalties for unremarkable conduct, i.e., conduct that should be 
governed by civil statute or no statute at all.3 And for the many reasons 
 
*
  Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business; 
2011–12 Supreme Court Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States. 
1
  United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct. 1935 
(2014) [http://perma.cc/KM32-D2TY]. 
2




  Overcriminalization is defined in various ways, but most definitions center on the misuse of the 
criminal law and the resulting harms. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and 
Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 
745 (2014) [http://perma.cc/4GZC-RQJR]. 
109:152 (2015)  SOX on Fish 
 153 
explained in numerous articles on the subject, it is a real problem.4 Yates 
and a host of amici argue that applying Sarbanes-Oxley to fishing is 
quintessential overcriminalization, and its evils weigh in favor of 
overturning his conviction. 
I certainly agree.5 But this Essay is not specifically about the merits of 
Yates. Instead, it is about another harm of overcriminalization, one that has 
received little attention thus far. Drawing from the fields of criminology 
and behavioral ethics, this Essay makes the case that overcriminalization 
actually increases the commission of criminal acts, particularly by white-
collar offenders. This is different from how we usually think of 
overcriminalization’s ills—that the proliferation of criminal laws leads to 
increasing and inconsistent post-act criminal adjudication. 
Overcriminalization increases the commission of criminal acts by fueling 
offender rationalizations, which are part of the psychological process 
necessary for the commission of crime. Without rationalizations, white-
collar offenders like Yates are unable to square their self-perception as 
“good people” with the illegal behavior they are contemplating, and 
therefore their criminal conduct does not go forward. Overcriminalization, 
then, is more than a post-act concern. It is inherently criminogenic because 
it facilitates some of the most prevalent and powerful rationalizations used 
by would-be offenders, completing the psychological circuit that allows for 
criminal violations. 
This phenomenon, which presents a new way of understanding the 
harms of overcriminalization, is on display in Yates. Therefore, the case—
regardless of how the Court decides it—offers a useful vehicle through 
which to explore the full scope of overcriminalization’s detriments. 
Part I of this Essay introduces the concept of rationalizations and the 
way in which they allow for criminal conduct. Part II shows how 
overcriminalization delegitimizes the criminal law, particularly in the 
white-collar context, and, in turn, increases the opportunities for offender 
rationalizations. Part III then discusses Yates as an illustration of this new 
harm of overcriminalization. 
I. THE ROLE OF RATIONALIZATIONS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
Before understanding how overcriminalization increases criminal acts, 
it is necessary to understand how rationalizations affect criminality. While 
not receiving much focus in legal scholarship, experts have long understood 
the role rationalizations play in unethical and criminal behavior. In the 
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1950s, criminologist Donald Cressey recognized that criminal behavior 
involves “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the 
violation of law.”6 Cressey determined that three key elements are 
necessary for violations of trust—the essence of almost all white-collar 
crime—to occur: (1) an individual possesses a “nonshareable problem,” i.e., 
a problem the individual feels cannot be solved by revealing it to others; (2) 
the individual believes the problem can be solved in secret by violating a 
trust; and (3) the individual “verbalizes” the relationship between the 
nonshareable problem and the illegal solution in “language that lets him 
look on trust violation as something other than trust violation.”7 
Cressey believed that verbalizations—what we commonly call 
rationalizations—were “the crux of the problem,” because they allowed the 
offender to keep his perception of himself as an honest citizen intact while 
acting in a criminal manner.8 Importantly, Cressey found that verbalizations 
were not simply after-the-fact excuses offenders used to lessen their 
culpability upon being caught. Instead, verbalizations were “[v]ocabularies 
of motive,” words and phrases that existed as group definitions labeling 
deviant behavior as appropriate, rather than excuses invented by the 
offender “on the spur of the moment.”9 In other words, offender 
verbalizations are drawn from larger society and put into use prior to the 
commission of criminal acts. 
This insight—that offenders rationalize their unethical or criminal 
conduct ex ante, which then allows their conduct to proceed—has greatly 
influenced the study of white-collar crime and business ethics.10 It has also 
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led to the identification of a host of rationalizations commonly employed by 
white-collar offenders. In order to provide a sense of how these 
rationalizations operate, below are descriptions of three of the most 
prevalent.11 These examples also prove relevant to Part III’s discussion, 
illustrating the connection between overcriminalization and rationalizations 
through the Yates case. 
Denial of injury. One of the most common ways white-collar criminals 
mentally relieve themselves of responsibility for their actions is by denying 
the injury they will cause.12 This rationalization allows wrongdoers to 
believe that no one will really be harmed by their conduct. If an act’s 
wrongfulness is partly a function of the harm it produces, an offender can 
mollify concern about the morality of her behavior if she believes no clear 
harm exists. The classic denial of injury rationalization in white-collar 
crime is an embezzler describing her actions as “borrowing” the money; in 
the offender’s estimation, no one will be hurt because the money will be 
paid back.13 
Condemning the condemners. White-collar offenders may also 
rationalize their behavior by shifting attention away from their conduct onto 
the motives of other persons, a process called “condemning the 
condemners.”14 In doing so, the offender “has changed the subject of the 
conversation[;] . . . by attacking others, the wrongfulness of [her] own 
behavior is more easily repressed.”15 This rationalization takes numerous 
forms in white-collar cases: offenders call their critics hypocrites, argue 
their critics are motivated by spite or personal gain, or claim selective 
enforcement. Regulators, prosecutors, and government agencies are the 
usual targets of such condemnation. 
Denial of responsibility. The denial of responsibility rationalization 
employed by white-collar offenders is the most prevalent and powerful. 
Called the “master account,” this rationalization occurs whenever an 
offender defines her conduct in a way that relieves her of responsibility, 
thereby mitigating “both social disapproval and a personal sense of 
failure.”16 Most offenders do this by claiming their behavior is accidental or 
due to forces outside their control, but the rationalization is employed any 
time the offender views herself as “more acted upon than acting.”17 White-
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collar offenders may deny responsibility by pleading ignorance, suggesting 
they were acting under orders, or contending larger economic conditions 
caused them to act unethically. Researchers have found that the complexity 
of laws regulating business and the hierarchical structure of companies offer 
white-collar offenders numerous ways to deny their responsibility.18 
II. THE ROLE OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION IN FUELING WHITE-COLLAR 
OFFENDER RATIONALIZATIONS 
With that understanding, the harms of overcriminalization may be 
more fully appreciated. Overcriminalization’s evils typically have been 
viewed through the lens of the enforcement and adjudication of criminal 
laws after the offender’s conduct occurs—whether, for example, an 
offender was subject to too much prosecutorial discretion or faced disparate 
enforcement or punishment. This Essay suggests there is an additional, 
possibly more pernicious, harm in the way overcriminalization impacts an 
offender’s psychological process before he takes action. That is because 
overcriminalization facilitates the rationalizations that allow criminal acts, 
particularly those committed by white-collar offenders, to go forward. In 
other words, overcriminalization not only causes unnecessary criminal 
violations through unjustified enforcement and adjudication, but it also 
causes criminal behavior itself . Would-be white-collar offenders draw on 
the rationalizations that are created by overcriminalization, and then employ 
those rationalizations to complete the critical psychological step that results 
in criminal behavior. 
How overcriminalization causes illegal behavior is not only a function 
of the way in which rationalizations operate, but also of where they 
originate. As Cressey explained, rationalizations are not created in a 
vacuum; offenders do not invent them in the spur of the moment. Instead, 
offenders find their vocabularies of motive within their own environments. 
Cressey suggested that rationalizations are “taken over” from “popular 
ideologies that sanction crime in our culture.”19 He pointed to commonplace 
sayings that suggest wrongdoing is acceptable in certain situations: 
“Honesty is the best policy, but business is business” and “All people steal 
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19
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when they get in a tight spot.”20 Once verbalizations such as these have been 
“assimilated and internalized by individuals,” they form powerful 
rationalizing constructs that allow illegal behavior to go forward.21 
Building on this idea, two other criminologists, Gresham Sykes and 
David Matza, found that offender verbalizations originate from an even 
more specific location: the criminal law itself. According to Sykes and 
Matza, great “flexibility” exists in criminal law; even if a defendant 
commits a bad act, he may avoid punishment if he provides a legally valid 
justification or defense.22 Citing defenses to criminal liability such as 
necessity, insanity, and self-defense, Sykes and Matza viewed application 
of the criminal law as variable, a circumstance they found offenders 
incorporate into their psychological processes.23 Sykes and Matza 
determined that most anti-normative behavior was based on “what is 
essentially an unrecognized extension of [legal] defenses to crimes, in the 
form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent 
but not by the legal system or society at large.”24 Put another way, would-be 
lawbreakers use verbalizations to rationalize their behavior in order to fit it 
within a “defense” to the law that they deem valid, but that society or a 
court may not. 
If rationalizations are drawn from an offender’s environment, which 
includes from the criminal law itself, overcriminalization has a significant 
role in creating unethical and criminal behavior. Here it is helpful to more 
specifically identify how overcriminalization impacts the criminal law. 
William Stuntz, one of the most thoughtful scholars writing about 
overcriminalization, found that the overwhelming depth and breadth of the 
criminal law has led to two related consequences.25 First, lawmaking has 
shifted to prosecutors. Because the criminal law is so broad, it cannot be 
enforced as written; therefore, enforcement on the streets differs from the 
“law on the books.”26 Decisions about enforcement—the “criminal justice 
system’s real lawmak[ing]”—fall to prosecutors and police.27 They make 
law through their enforcement choices, not legislatures through traditional 
democratic governance or courts through issuing opinions. The inevitable 
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result of prosecutor and police lawmaking is selective, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory application of the criminal code.28 
Second, prosecutors, not courts, adjudicate crime.29 With so many 
overlapping criminal statutes and regulations to choose from, prosecutors 
can charge a range of crimes governing the same conduct. They can charge 
defendants with the easiest crime to prove, the crime with the highest 
penalty, or—by stacking multiple charges—both. This allows prosecutors 
to enforce laws more cheaply, thereby lowering the cost of convicting 
defendants, primarily through plea agreements. Prosecutors are “not so 
much redefining criminal law . . . as deciding whether its requirements are 
met, case by case.”30 Regardless of the decisions prosecutors make, they are 
de facto adjudicating outcomes. This leads to, among other things, the 
circumvention of procedural protections guaranteed to the accused.31 
These consequences of overcriminalization are serious in their own 
right, but the common thread running through them reveals something more 
profound: overcriminalization makes the criminal justice system more 
uncoordinated and illogical, more unjustifiable. Whether it is inconsistent 
enforcement or overly harsh adjudication, overcriminalization lessens the 
law’s overall legitimacy. It is this perceived illegitimacy that provides space 
for would-be wrongdoers to rationalize their conduct. They see “defenses” 
to the law all around them, which they then internalize and incorporate into 
their own thought processes. Once this occurs, there is little stopping an 
offender’s future criminal conduct from going forward. 
Consider a common “respectable” criminal: the tax cheat. He is faced 
with a financial dilemma that can be solved by violating a trust—reducing 
the amount of taxes he will pay by failing to report some of his income. He 
knows lying and cheating are wrong, and he does not see himself as a 
criminal.32 But, if he begins rationalizing his potential bad conduct, he starts 
to reconcile the disconnect between his self-perception as an upstanding 
person and the crime he is considering committing. For example, he may 
think about how complex the tax code is; there are literally thousands of 
pages of rules and regulations. Can he really be expected to follow the rules 
perfectly (denial of responsibility)? He may also think that all of those rules 
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make filing taxes essentially a game that rewards being shrewd (denial of 
injury). Even if he did fudge the numbers a bit, he may say to himself that it 
is not a real crime—at best it is a regulatory issue (denial of injury). 
Besides, the government is so big now it will never miss one filer’s income 
(denial of the victim). Even if it did, the government does not deserve his 
money—it is so bloated and wasteful, he is not about to contribute to the 
problem (condemning the condemners). In the span of a few minutes, the 
would-be tax cheat has gone from someone who would never think of 
committing a crime to being on the verge of committing fraud. 
Importantly, many of these rationalizations are available—or are 
available in increased strength and frequency—because of 
overcriminalization. The criminal tax code is now made up of over a dozen 
broad and overlapping substantive statutes and many more “secondary 
offenses.”33 Further, enforcing criminal tax laws uniformly is impossible. 
Only about two percent of filers are audited, and a tiny fraction of those are 
penalized—even fewer criminally.34 This necessarily means the IRS’s 
criminal enforcement agents are exercising significant discretion in what 
the law is and how it is enforced. This leads to the many consequences 
discussed above, including the fostering of rationalizations to be adopted by 
white-collar criminals. Overcriminalization, then, fuels an environment ripe 
for rationalizations, in turn fostering the very conduct the criminal law 
seeks to eliminate. 
III. THE ROLE OVERCRIMINALIZATION PLAYED IN JOHN YATES 
RATIONALIZING HIS CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
Thus far, this Essay has attempted to present a more complete 
understanding of overcriminalization’s harms, but in a mostly theoretical 
way. However, the facts of Yates provide a ready practical example of how 
overcriminalization fuels offender rationalizations, thereby facilitating 
criminal behavior. As his case progressed to the Supreme Court, John Yates 
made a series of statements indicating that he rationalized his criminal 
conduct in numerous ways. Strikingly, some of his rationalizations were 
directly related to the overlapping and expansive nature of the law 
governing his conduct. 
Before addressing Yates’ specific rationalizations, however, some 
prefatory comments are necessary. First, despite his blue-collar profession, 
Yates clearly fits within the strictures of a white-collar criminal, the 
 
33
  John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 609–10 
(2005) (defining secondary offenses, such as money laundering and obstruction of justice, as “offenses 
that consist entirely of actions that make it  more difficult for the government to prosecute other 
substantive criminal offenses”) [https://perma.cc/7HJQ-LET6]. See generally IRS, T AX CRIMES 
HANDBOOK (2009) [http://perma.cc/NV2E-AE4E]. 
34
  Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance , 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 
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category of offender most likely to employ rationalizations.35 Second, Yates 
was in a position to rationalize. He was faced with a nonsharable financial 
problem—the potential loss of his fishing license for possessing undersized 
fish—that could be solved by violating a trust—throwing those fish 
overboard after being told not to by a federal agent. The only thing 
preventing Yates from committing a criminal act was finding a 
rationalization that allowed him to maintain “the image of [him]self as a 
trusted person.”36 Unfortunately, such rationalizations were readily 
available. 
For example, the most obvious rationalization Yates employed was to 
deny his responsibility. Just after the federal agents left his boat, and as he 
was preparing to throw dozens of fish overboard, he told his crew that “if 
the [officers] wanted to make sure that the fish were still [on board], they 
should have put a mark on their foreheads.”37 This statement is a classic 
“vocabulary of motive.” By minimizing his own responsibility—it was the 
agent’s fault, not his—Yates was able to look on his obviously improper 
behavior as acceptable. This allowed him to keep his self-perception as an 
“unassuming, hardworking American[]” intact despite violating a clear 
trust.38 
Yates also rationalized his actions by condemning his condemners. 
During the inspection of his catch, Yates questioned the agent—a Florida 
fish and game officer deputized as a federal agent—on how he was 
measuring each grouper.39 He also questioned why the agent was leaving 
the undersized fish on the boat at all.40 This suggests Yates believed the 
agent was incompetent or lazy, or was improperly or selectively enforcing 
the size requirements—typical condemning-the-condemners 
rationalizations. 
In addition, Yates relied on the denial-of-injury rationalization when he 
argued during the inspection that having a few undersized grouper in his 
more than 3000-fish catch was outside of his control.41 His argument 
indicates that he deemed possessing undersized fish to be only a minor 
 
35
  See supra note 7. Most obviously, Yates was charged with three white-collar offenses—two 
obstruction counts and lying to a federal agent. In addition, he is almost sixty years old, married, and has 
a steady job as a boat captain responsible for the welfare of a crew, all factors suggest ing he is able to 
conform to normative roles and has a self-interest in doing so.  
36
  Cressey, supra note 7, at 14. 
37
  Brief for the United States at 7, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (S. Ct. Aug. 19, 2014) 
(alterations in original) [http://perma.cc/D6CJ-BFHP]. 
38
  John Yates, A Fish Story, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2014/04/a-fish-story-106010.html [http://perma.cc/D8A6-NVJ2]. 
39
  T ranscript of Jury Trial, Day Two at 10, 36, United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FtM-29SPC 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011). 
40
  T ranscript of Sentencing at 52, United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FtM-29SPC (M.D. Fla. 
Dec. 8, 2011). 
41
  T ranscript of Jury Trial, Day Two, supra note 39, at 94. 
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infraction for which he should not be held responsible. But that thinking 
also allowed him to rationalize the destruction of evidence by him and his 
crew—a serious criminal offense—as harming no one. This type of mental 
progression demonstrates the power of rationalizations. 
Although Yates employed a number of other rationalizations during 
and after his criminal conduct, these three can be seen as flowing from 
overcriminalization. Each one is drawn from Yates’s belief that commercial 
fishing and inspection law lacks legitimacy. Throughout his case, including 
prior to committing the acts giving rise to his conviction, he questioned the 
validity of the fishing regulations and the related secondary offenses with 
which he was charged.42 He also questioned the exercise of discretion by the 
government agents and prosecutors.43 And he questioned the criminal law’s 
applicability to him and his behavior.44 None of that is surprising given 
Yates’ environment and the legal landscape he faced—a world governed by 
multiple laws addressing the same conduct, overlapping state and federal 
jurisdiction, overlapping enforcement actors, and incongruous civil and 
criminal penalties. This is quintessential overcriminalization, and it aided 
Yates in creating criminogenic rationalizations. That by no means excuses 
his behavior, but it does provide a new way of understanding 
overcriminalization’s harms.  
CONCLUSION 
It is said that hard cases make bad law. What about odd cases? During 
argument on Yates, the Justices struggled with a criminal statute that clearly 
did not fit with how it was being used by the government—it was too broad, 
too vague, and too severe.45 That may be enough to overturn Yates’s 
conviction, which would be a positive step toward reducing 
overcriminalization’s harms. Even so, the case will have little impact on the 
“deeply compromised” nature of our criminal justice system.46 With almost 
5000 criminal statutes, and upwards of 300,000 quasi-criminal regulatory 
 
42
  Id. (Yates stated, “I believe the agent originally measured my catch improperly and erratically,” 
and “I should have incurred a financial penalty . . . [but] the Department of Just ice wanted a pound of 
flesh.”). 
43
  Id. (“Nearly three years [after being issued a civil citation], the federal government charged me 
with the destruction of evidence—yes, fish—to impede a federal investigation.”). 
44
  Id. (“It says something about federal criminal law that it  can be used against unassuming, 
hardworking Americans for a state civil matter.”).  
45
  T ranscript of Oral Argument passim, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (S. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014) 
[http://perma.cc/F7XR-4SWX]. Nearly all the Justices asked questions concerning the breadth of 
Sarbanes-Oxley as applied to Yates, how it  interacted with overlapping obstruction statutes, the 
harshness of its twenty-year maximum sentence, and the government’s off-balance exercise of its 
charging discretion. Id. 
46
  Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1662 (2012) [http://perma.cc/WVK7-264Q]. 
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provisions,47 it is going to take a lot more “fishy SOX cases” to remedy the 
problem of overcriminalization. Hopefully this Essay will provide yet 




  Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 529, 531 n.10 (2012) [http://perma.cc/PG7N-WLY7]; cf. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 513–14 
(documenting the parallel growth of the criminal code at the state level).  
